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WILLS AND TRUSTS
COLEMAN KARESH'*
During the period under review the South Carolina
Supreme Court considered several cases in which the ques-
tions for decision arose from dispositions made by will. The
problems were principally constructional, and as a matter of
classification, although stemming from wills, they are treated
elsewhere in this Survey-in Property1 or Taxation.2 Aside
from the specific meanings and operation of the language
employed in the respective cases, some familiar principles are
restated in them which are customarily dealt with in the Sur-
vey subject of Wills. Thus, in Montague v. South Carolina
Tax Commission,3 it is stated that the primary inquiry in
construing the provisions of a will is the intention of the test-
ator at the time of the making of the will; that the intention
should be effectuated unless it contravenes some well-settled
rule of law or public policy ;4 that the will must be read as a
*hole; and that "'where an estate or interest is once given by
words of clear and ascertained legal significance, it will
4either be enlarged nor cut down by superadded words in the
same or subsequent clauses, unless they raise an irresistible
inference that such was the intention of the testator.'" In
Taylor v. Jennings,5 the Court reaffirmed the rule that on the
death of a testator his real estate vests immediately and
directly on his devisees, and where such estate is given for life
with remainder, title vests at once in the life tenant and re-
maindermen. In Purvis v. McElveenG the Court adverted to
and followed the rule that a possibility of reverter is not de-
visable or inheritable.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S. C. 94, 106 S. E. 2d 913 (1959) ; Thom-
ason v. Hellams, 233 S. C. 11, 103 S. E. 2d 324 (1958); Taylor v. Jen-
nings, 233 S. C. 600, 106 S. E. 2d 391 (1958); Dean v. Lancaster, 233
S. C. 530, 105 S. E. 2d 675 (1958); Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S. C. 123,
107 S. E. 2d 4 (1959).
2. Montague v. S. C. Tax Comm., 233 S. C. 110, 103 S. E. 2d 769
(1958).
3. Note 2, supra.
4. The same rule was stated in Dean v. Lancaster, note 1, supra.
5. Note 1, supra,
6. Note 1, supra.
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The case of Rushton v. Smith, 7 which involves an action
under Lord Campbell's Act and is therefore treated under
Torts and Procedure, is mentioned here because of the pres-
ence of a suing administrator and the contrast as to devolu-
tion of rights between that act and the Statute of Descent and
Distribution. In the case noted it was held that where a wife
was wrongfully killed and the husband died thereafter before
institution of the action, the cause of action did not pass
beneficially to his representatives but to the next remoter
class of the wife's beneficiaries mentioned in the Act.7s In so
holding the Court declined to overrule or modify two earlier
cases on the subject with similar facts. 8 If the Act and the
Statute of Descent and Distribution were to be equated in
terms of the latter, the opposite result would of course have
followed.
The case of Want v. AZfred M. Best Co., Inc.9 which in-
volved the administration of an insolvent decedent's estate,
raises a number of problems in estate administration and
trusts. So far as the administration questions are concerned,
no salient principles of law appear, the issues being resolved
principally on their merits. There are, in addition, tax fea-
tures and procedural questions relative to tax claims of the
United States, which are treated elsewhere in the Survey. The
propriety of asserting the tax claims in the Court of Common
Pleas was upheld, the Supreme Court pointing out that the
Common Pleas proceeding was in rem, having for its subject
matter the assets of the estate and concerned with its liquida-
tion and dispostion; and "Having taken that subject matter
into its control, the Court of Common Pleas may retain such
control, exclusively, until its duty has been fully performed."
The major, and perhaps most important, aspect of the case
concerned the claims of certain claimants asserting preferen-
ces as alleged cestuis que trust under trusts ex moleficio.
Basically their contentions were founded upon two sets of
facts: the decedent had collected funds for them which he had
not remitted; and he had received from them for investment
funds which he had misappropriated or dissipated. The
7. 233 S. C. 292, 104 S. E. 2d 374 (1958).
7a. CoDE oF LAWS oF SoUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1952.
8. Morris v. Spartanburg Ry. Gas & Elec. Co, 70 S. C. 279, 49 S. E.
854 (1904), und ElkIn v. Southern By., 156 S. 0. 390, 153 S. E. 337
(1930).
9. 233 S. 0. 460, 105 S. E. 2d 678 (1958).
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funds could not be traced or identified. (There were other
claimants whose moneys were traced into other products, to
which they were held entitled on a constructive trust.) The
lower court, under the seeming authority of the well-known
case of Ex Parte Bank of Aynor, 10 held favorably to the
claimants, the Supreme Court viewing the holding of the
lower court as deciding that all property of the decedent at
the time of his death insolvent "became, by the very fact
of his defalcations, a trust fund of which his executrix is
trustee, for the benefit of those persons whose money had been
lost through such breaches of trust, to the exclusion of all
other creditors."
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, stating that
"while some statements in the Bank of Aynor opinion went be-
yond the requirements of the issues in that case, we do not
think that the decision, when viewed in the light of the fac-
tual situation before the court in that case, requires the con-
clusion reached by the lower court in the case at bar." The
Court then gives a lengthy recital of the facts in the Bank of
Aynor case and a detailed analysis of the holding there, with
the oft-quoted excerpt from the opinion of Justice Cothran in
the case drawing distinction between "an ordinary construc-
tive trust and a constructive trust ex maleficio." in Justice
Cothran's words, "The beneficiary of a simple constructive
trust is no more than an ordinary contract creditor, except
where he can point to a fund in the hands of a receiver upon
which his asserted trust is to operate. * * * But the case is
quite different from a constructive trust ex maleficio. * * *
The beneficiary occupies a much more favorable position than
that of the general creditors or the beneficiaries of a simple
constructive trust. * * * If it can be shown therefore that the
mis-appropriated fund went into the coffers of the corpora-
tion prior to receivership, was disbursed by the corporation in
the payment of debts or in the acquisition of property, there
can be no reason or justice in allowing the general creditors to
receive the benefit of stolen property simply for the reason
that a corresponding amount of money was not turned over
to the receiver."
The Supreme Court's dissection of the Aynor case led it
to conclude that so far as the statement just quoted-and
10. 144 S. C. 147, 142 S. E. 239 (1927).
[Vol. 12
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others-suggested that all the assets in the receiver's hands
constituted a trust res for the benefit of the defrauded bene-
ficiary, those statements were erroneous; but that actually
"the conclusion to which the main opinion led was this: that
because the proceeds of the notes that had been left with
American Bank and Trust Company in trust had been mis-
appropriated and used to reduce its liabilities immediately
prior to its failure, the Bank of Aynor, whose money had thus
indirectly swollen the assets that came into the receiver's
hands, was entitled, in the distribution of the insolvent bank's
assets, to priority over depositors and general creditors.
Stated more simply, the opinion in reality recognized the
Bank of Aynor not as a cestui entitled to a trust res, but as a
preferred creditor."
From the lIst sentence in the quoted statement, one might
receive the impression that until the present court's approval
the Bank of Aynor case stands for the proposition that a bene-
ficiary who has been injured by a fraudulent breach of trust,
while not entitled to claim as a cestui because of the absence
of tracing, may nevertheless be some sort of preferred credi-
tor. But as Justice Legge, writer of the opinion in the instant
case, himself points out, the Court in the Bank of Aynor case,
while deciding unanimously that the securities set aside by
American Bank & Trust Company to take the place of the
Bank of Aynor's misconverted notes were impressed with a
lien," deferred the question whether the Bank of Aynor
should otherwise be treated as a preferred creditor-in this
respect not immediately accepting the views of Justice Coth-
ran who urged the preferment upon the ground of a so-called
constructive trust ex maleficio. But while there may have been
a reservation as to conceding a preferred status on the ground
11. The following comment on this aspect of the case appears in an
annotation in 82 A. L. R. 46, 198: "The report is not altogether clear
as to whether the decision is based upon the theory that the securities
which were set aside by the bank were a substitute for the trust fund
and the trust fund was traced into such securities, or on the theory
that the owner of the notes merely had a lien on such securities as a
result of the pledge thereof to secure the payment of the proceeds of
the notes; but the latter principle seems to have been uppermost in the
court's mind."
There is no doubt that in Justice Cothran's mind the substituted se-
curities were impressed with a trust; and for the purposes of the case it
would make no difference whether the Bank of Aynor had a preference
by way of lien or by way of trust.
1959]
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of a constructive trust ex maleficio, the views of Justice Coth-
ran that preference should be given such claimants as bene-
ficiaries of such a trust prevailed unquestionably-and in fact
became fixed as law-in later cases.12 These later cases
favored the claimants under fraudulent breaches of trust and
other frauds as preferred creditors because they were cestuis
of such trusts, and not because of some other right or equity,
and in so doing it was made plain that there was no require-
ment of tracing or identification. These cases were not based
on any misapprehension of the Bank of Aynor case but on a
deliberate acceptance of the views stated by Justice Cothran
in that case. In the absence of a lien growing out of the facts
which are an alternative to a constructive trust and absent
any statutory preference, it is difficult to perceive any basis
for preference over general creditors unless some trust theory
is invoked. If the lower court in the instant case relied on
erroneous and unnecessary statements in the Bank of Aynor
case, it was at the same time justifiably relying for precedent
12. In Ex Parte Hernlen, 156 S. C. 181, 153 S. E. 133 (1930), Justice
Cothran, writing the opinion in which the xest of the Court concurred,
declared: "It is an established principle, under the case of Ex Parte
Bank of Aynor * * * that the beneficiary of such a trust as this is en-
titled to be preferred in the distribution of the assets of a failed bank,
over the general creditors." In Peurifoy v. Boswell, 162 S. C. 107, 160
S. E. 156 (1931), the effect of the Bank of Aynor case was stated to be:
"In the case referred to [Bank of Aynor] the doctrine was declared
that there was a difference between the beneficiary of a trust ex mae-
ficio and the beneficiary of a simple constructive trust. In the one the
beneficiary is entitled to a preference in the distribution of the assets,
but in the other he only shaxes in the assets as a general creditor of the
bank." The principle advanced by Justice Cothran was reaffirmed and
followed in Hampton County v. Lightsey, 164 S. C. 63, 161 S. E. 879
(1931) ; Bradley v. Guess, 165 S. C. 161, 163 S. E. 466 (1931) ; Spartan-
burg County v. Arthur, 169 S. C. 456, 169 S. E. 235 (1932); Fant v.
Easley Loan & Trust Co., 170 S. C. 61, 169 S. E. 59 (1932), in which the
Court, being asked for and allowing review of the Bank of Aynor case
and the cases dependent on it, adhered to its opinion in the Bank of
Aynor case and the cases following it. In Spartan Mills v. Law, 186
S. C. 61, 67, 194 S. E. 653 (1937), the rule of the Bank of Aynor case
was followed: "The claimant, in order to establish his preferred status,
must show the creation of a trust prior to the receivership and also
prove a trust res which actually augmented the assets of the closed
ank, which trust res can be traced into the hands of the Receiver upon
insolvency. * * * Of course a different rule applies to a trust ex male-
fi * * ." There were other cases in which the rule of the Bank of
Avnor case, as accepted by later cases, was urged by claimants of pref-
erences, and in them, where the result was unfavorable, the Court decided
not on the basis that the rule was wrong but that the facts did not fit
the rule. In fact, the only dissatisfaction expressed with the rule
dissatisfaction which did not result in its overthrow - was in the state-
ment of Acting Associate Justice Cothran in S. C. State Bank v. Citizens
Bank, 173 S. C. 496, 176 S. E. 346 (1934), in which he speaks of "that
much disputed and doubtful doctrine."
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on the later cases which accepted those "erroneous" state-
ments as the law. If it is, or is to be, the law that beneficiaries
of a wrongdoing fiduciary, or the victims of theft or fraud
(in whose favor constructive trusts may also arise-since in
order to establish such a trust a fiduciary relationship need
not exist at the outset)13 are to be treated on the insolvency
of the wrongdoer, into whose assets the misappropriated or
misacquired property cannot be traced, as preferred creditors
and not as cestuis, general creditors can draw small comfort
from the attaching of one label rather than another.14
13. Bank of Williston v. Alderman, 106 S. C. 386, 91 S. E. 296 (1916).
14. Cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 202 (2d ed. 1959): "Following Prop-
erty unto its Product. (1) Where the trustee by the wrongful disposi-
tion of trust property acquires other property, the beneficiary at his
option is entitled either to enforce a constructive trust of the property
so acquired or to enforce an equitable lien upon it to secure his claim
against the trustee for damages for breach of trust, as long as the
product of the trust property is held by the trustee and can be traced.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (1) the claim of the beneficiary
against the trustee for breach of trust is that of a general creditor."
See comment o to this Section, and the statement in the cross-reference
that "The general rule as to the following into its product of property
wrongfully disposed of is not limited to trust property. As to the appli-
cation of the rule to other wrongdoers, as well as to trustees, see RE-
STATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 202-215 (1937)." In the Section 215 men-
tioned, the rule is stated that "where a person wrongfully disposes of the
property of another but the property cannot be traced into any product,
the other has merely a personal claim against the wrongdoer and cannot
enforce a constructive trust or lien upon any part of the wrongdoer's
property." It is further stated that the claim "is only that of a general
creditor of the wrongdoer."
In the instant case the Supreme Court, having decided that the claim-
ants were not cestuis but creditors, postponed their claims to the tax
claims of the United States and subordinated them to funeral and admin-
istrative expenses and to dower and homestead. It added that "whether
or not their claims are entitled to priority over the general creditors is
a matter not involved in this appeal." It is submitted that the quoted
statement would, be more reflective of the law and of the conclusion
reached in the case if the word "other" were inserted before "general
creditors."
The priority accorded the United States over creditors was based on
Federal law - 31 U. S. C. A. §§ 191-192 (1954). Aside from these stat-
utes, which were controlling enough, it is probable that preference would
have been given under state law, by virtue of the statute prescribing
the order of payment of a decedent's debts: Subsection (2) of § 19-476
of the S. C. Code, 1952, calling for payment of "debts due to the public",
next in order after payment of funeral expenses, expenses of last illness
and administrative costs directed in Subsection (1), and prior in order
to payment of "Bonds, debts by specialty, and debts by simple contract"
under Subsection (5).
Except where there is a lien existing at the time of death, Purdy v.
Strother, 184 S. C. 210, 192 S. E. 159 (1937), or a trust attaching to
specific property, the order of payment prescribed by § 19-476 controls.
Precisely where beneficiaries whose claims for breach of trust cannot
be satisfied out of specific property as a trust res, and who therefore
are creditors, fit into this statute is not clear. The statute itself does
not give them any preferred status over even "simple contract creditors".
1959]
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Despite the seeming reluctance of the Court to repudiate
the Bank of Aynor case, and the effort to rationalize its re-
sult, it would seem from the summary of principles which the
Court sets out as a guide that the net effect of the decision
in the instant case is at least to overthrow the announced
rule-whether followed or not in the Bank of Aynor case and
certainly followed in subsequent cases-that gives the de-
frauded beneficiary a trust interest in all the assets of an in-
solvent even though there is no tracing of the misused funds.
The Court gives the following valuable summary which should
clarify and crystalize the law on the subject:
1. If a trustee, having commingled a trust fund with
his personal funds in a single bank account or other fund,
becomes insolvent, the trust fund does not, by the mere
commingling, lose its identity. If the cestui can substan-
tially identify it, by tracing it into the commingled fund
in the hands of the insolvent's receiver, he may reclaim
it. In those circumstances there is a trust ex maleficio, be-
cause there is a trust res, vis.: so much of the com-
mingled fund as has been thus identified.
2. Substantial identification, e.g., by tracing trust
funds, or property, or the proceeds of sale of such prop-
erty, into the commingled fund in the hands of the re-
ceiver, is essential if the claimant is to establish his posi-
tion, as that of cestui rather than creditor; for there can
be no cestui except there be a trust res.
3. Where the claimant cannot trace his money into,
and thus identify it as part of, a particular fund or prop-
erty in the hands of the receiver, his status is that of a
creditor in the receivership even though he may be able
to show that his money augmented the general assets of
the insolvent existing at the time of the receivership and
thus coming into the receiver's hands. He is a creditor,
not the cestui of a trust, for the simple reason that there
is no identifiable trust res.
While these summarized principles once and for all dispel
the notion that a trust can be established in assets into which
there has been no tracing (and logic is all on that side), and
clarity and certainty are thus introduced, it does not add to
resolution of the problem if the inference is to be drawn that
even though a trust cannot be established a preference will
[Vol. 12
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nonetheless be given. The time will surely come when claim-
ants like those in the instant case will compete with general
creditors of an insolvent, and in a case where the matter will
not become academic because of the entry into the fray of a
formidable opponent like the United States, armed with a sta-
tutory preferment which sweeps away all the assets. Without
tracing, they will not be cestuis; but will they be preferred on
some other theory? And the time will also come when the case
is not one of a defrauding fiduciary but another kind of perpe-
trator of fraud. John owes Paul and Ezra. John robs Peter
to pay Paul. John becomes insolvent. Peter is not cestui be-
cause the funds cannot be traced into John's assets. But will
Peter come ahead of Ezra in the application of John's assets?
If he does, why?
Legislation
Two statutes affecting trusts were enacted by the 1959 Gen-
eral Assembly. Act No. 22515 provides for nominee registra-
tion of securities held by banks, trust companies and other
corporate fiduciaries and prescribes the regulations and terms
of such registration. Act No. 22616 amends the general invest-
ment statute17 in several important respects, clarifying the
language of the original statute, enlarging the scope of per-
missible investments and further defining and prescribing the
terms and limits of investments. The obscurity in the original
statute regarding debentures is removed, under Subsection
(1) which permits investment in debentures, notes, bonds or
other obligations, whether secured by real estate mortgage or
not, if the issuing corporation has an unbroken record of cash
dividends payments during the period of ten years preceding
the date of purchase. Subsection (2) clarifies, and enlarges
the range of, investment in first mortgages on real estate.
Under the earlier version of the investment statute invest-
ment in corporate mortgages apparently could not be made ex-
cept by purchase from the mortgagee or his assignees, since
the secured obligation must have been outstanding for at least
five years and no default in payment of interest should have
occurred; under the amendment mortgages, individual and
corporate, may be taken by the fiduciary directly from the
15. 51 STAT. 376.
16. 51 STAT. 378.
17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1952, § 67-58.
1959]
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [], Art. 19
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol12/iss1/19
188 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
mortgagor. There is no requirement for prior life of the obli-
gation and the amendment speaks of the mortgage "given by
the mortgagor to the fiduciary." If the mortgage is acquired
by purchase, the requirement remains that there shall have
been no default in the payment of interest; and in any event
whether the mortgage is obtained by direct acquisition from
the mortgagor or by purchase, the old requirement of sixty
per cent of value is retained.
9
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